A prompt
- is not a policy boundary.
An agent holding credentials acts at machine speed. A service-account log tells you which credential was used - not which agent, on whose behalf, in which session, or which approved operation ran. Qovery removes raw infrastructure credentials from the operating path and exposes a finite set of scoped operations in their place.
The model stays probabilistic. We will not tell you a wrong intent is impossible. What changes is that the operation it can request is bounded before it runs, tied to a specific principal, and reversible through a known path.
The agent, the human or service on whose behalf it acted, the session, the policy decision, and the resulting change.
Identity, role, environment and scope are checked at the API boundary. A refused call applies nothing, so there is no partial state to investigate.
Control plane and data plane are separated. Communication is encrypted and limited to the metadata and control information the architecture requires.
Fintech, healthtech and insurance organizations run Qovery inside their own cloud accounts.
Bounded access, complete attribution.
The claim is not that agents become predictable or that incidents become impossible. The claim is that you can say in advance what an operation may touch, afterwards who asked for it, and at any point how to reverse it.
No standing credentials in the agent path
- Agents call a finite catalog of operations rather than cloud APIs
- No keyring to store, rotate, leak or copy to a laptop
- Scope is bound to the requesting identity and the target environment
- An operation outside scope is refused before anything is applied
Attribution you can hand to an auditor
- Each action ties to the agent, the initiating human or service, and the session
- The policy decision is recorded alongside the resulting change
- One log covers humans, pipelines, portals and agents
- Evidence is exported rather than reconstructed from several systems
The boundary of your environment
- Workloads and customer data remain in your cloud account
- Control plane and data plane are separated by design
- Traffic is encrypted and limited to required metadata and control information
- Certification and regulatory-support claims are confirmed against current security documentation
Regulated teams in production.
"Previously, my SRE team needed to be extremely cautious about changes going to production. Now, we can feel much more confident."
"Qovery provided an easy-to-use interface that allowed us to manage our infrastructure within our own AWS account efficiently. It abstracted the complexities and let our developers focus on providing value to our customers."
"Qovery provided an easy-to-use interface that allowed us to efficiently manage our infrastructure within our own AWS account."
"Within a few days, we had something running that replicates our previous setup but with multiple environments, greater control, best practices in place, extensibility, and future-proof capabilities."
Qovery vs. IAM and human approval
Authorization tools answer whether an action may happen. They do not execute it, bound its parameters, or attribute it.
Answered straight.
Agents are not safe enough for production.
Agreed, and we do not argue otherwise. The model stays probabilistic and a wrong intent remains possible. What is bounded is the operation it can request, checked before it runs and reversible after.
Our IAM and policy tooling already handles authorization.
Authorization answers whether an action may happen. It does not execute the action, bound its parameters, distinguish the agent from the service account it borrowed, or give you a reversal path when the answer was yes and the outcome was wrong.
We already require human approval on every change.
That holds until volume rises. Then approval becomes either the bottleneck or a rubber stamp. Policy should absorb the routine cases so review is spent on the exceptions.
What leaves our cloud?
Workloads and customer data stay in your account. Control plane and data plane are separated, and communication is encrypted and limited to the metadata and control information the architecture requires. Bring your questionnaire to a security review and we will answer it line by line.
Bound it before you approve it.
Bring the agent use cases currently blocked because the boundary is unclear. We will walk through what is scoped, what is attributed, what is reversible - and what is not.