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The EU Cloud and AI Development Act: what the proposal means if you are planning a sovereign cloud deployment in Europe

The Cloud and AI Development Act is a European Commission proposal from 3 June 2026, still in negotiation in Parliament and Council. Here is what it would require (four Union assurance levels, public procurement rules, data centre acceleration zones), what it means for companies planning sovereign cloud deployments, and what to do before it becomes law.

Romaric Philogene
CEO & Co-founder
NOV 16, 2026 · 18 MIN
The EU Cloud and AI Development Act: what the proposal means if you are planning a sovereign cloud deployment in Europe

Key points:

  • The Cloud and AI Development Act (CADA) is a proposal, not law. The European Commission published it on 3 June 2026 as COM(2026) 502 under procedure 2026/0138(COD). As of mid-November 2026, the Council is negotiating a first compromise text and the European Parliament plans to adopt its position on 27 April 2027. Trilogues come after that.
  • Its core for cloud buyers is a four-level "Union assurance" framework. Level 1 requires EU establishment, EU infrastructure and EU-only customer data including metadata and telemetry, through self-assessment. Levels 2 to 4 need an independent audit and add EU personnel, EU-only support, a cybersecurity certificate, software supply chain controls and, from level 3, no control by a non-EU country or company.
  • The direct obligations target the public sector. As proposed, public sector bodies would buy at least level 1 services, and activities linked to public order (NIS2 sectors, internal security, borders, justice, law enforcement) would need level 2, 3 or 4 based on a national risk assessment. Private NIS2 entities could run the same assessment voluntarily.
  • Indirect effects reach much further. SaaS counts as a cloud computing service under the NIS2 definition CADA reuses, and the criteria cover subcontractors involved in delivering the service, so software vendors selling to EU public bodies would inherit the requirements, including their hosting provider's.
  • Plan for reversibility, not for one level. The final criteria will change in negotiation. Teams that run containers on Kubernetes, describe infrastructure as code and own their cloud account can move between providers and levels without a rebuild. Qovery deploys into your own AWS, GCP, Azure or Scaleway account, or your existing Kubernetes cluster at an EU provider or on-premise.

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The question I get most from European CTOs this autumn is some version of "does the new EU cloud act force us onto a European provider?". Today the answer is no, because there is no act yet. There is a 2026 proposal from the European Commission, and it is moving through Parliament and Council right now.

It still deserves your attention, because it is the first time the EU has written down, in a draft regulation, what "sovereign cloud" should mean in auditable criteria. If you are planning a sovereign deployment in 2027 or 2028, those criteria are the best preview you will get of what your public sector customers, and later your regulated customers, will ask for.

I am not a lawyer and this is not legal advice. Everything below comes from the proposal text on EUR-Lex, the Commission's own pages, the Parliament's procedure file and the Council's latest progress report, and I link each one.

What is the EU Cloud and AI Development Act, and what is its status today?

The Cloud and AI Development Act is a draft EU regulation that the European Commission proposed on 3 June 2026 to expand data centre capacity in Europe, create an EU-wide framework for assessing cloud sovereignty, and steer public procurement toward sovereign services. It is still a proposal in the ordinary legislative procedure, so none of its obligations apply yet.

The formal reference is COM(2026) 502 final, a proposal for a regulation "establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe's cloud and AI ecosystem". The Commission's CADA page groups it under three objectives: research and innovation, capacity, and autonomy.

The Commission's explanatory memorandum frames the problem with two numbers I see quoted everywhere, so here is the primary source for both: the market share of EU providers in the EU cloud market "decreased from 29% in 2017 to 15% in 2022", and "three non-EU hyperscalers control over 70% of the European cloud market" (COM(2026) 502).

Here is where the file stands, using only official sources:

DateStepSource
3 June 2026Commission adopts the proposal, COM(2026) 502EUR-Lex
10 and 16 June 2026Council starts work (Coreper presentation, then Working Party on Telecommunications)Council progress report 15300/26
24 June 2026Parliament appoints co-rapporteurs Diego Solier (ITRE) and Reinier Van Lanschot (IMCO)Parliament procedure file
29 July 2026European Data Protection Supervisor issues its opinionCouncil progress report
17 September 2026Committee referral announced in Parliament plenaryParliament procedure file
10 November 2026Irish Presidency presents a first partial compromise text on the sovereignty pillarCouncil progress report
1 December 2026Progress report goes to the Telecommunications CouncilCouncil progress report
27 April 2027 (planned)Parliament plans to adopt its positionCouncil progress report

After both institutions have a position, they negotiate a final text in trilogues. As proposed, the regulation would enter into force 20 days after publication in the Official Journal and apply one year later (Article 48). The Council compromise text extends that to 18 months.

My reading of that calendar is that, even with a fast trilogue, binding procurement rules are unlikely to apply before 2028. Nobody has committed to a date; this is my estimate.

What would the Cloud and AI Development Act require?

As proposed, the act would do three things: create a four-level EU framework that certifies how sovereign a cloud service is, oblige public buyers to procure services at a minimum level based on risk assessments, and speed up data centre permitting with a goal of tripling EU capacity. Most private companies would feel it through their public sector customers and their providers.

The proposal is organised in pillars. For a company planning deployments, these are the provisions that matter:

  • Capacity. The memorandum sets the aim to "triple EU capacity in the next five-to-seven years and reach the needed capacity by 2035". Member States would designate at least one data centre acceleration zone, with permit-granting for projects inside a zone capped at 12 months from a complete application.
  • A sovereignty framework. Article 16 creates "four Union assurance levels", with criteria in Annex II. Providers apply for recognition to the competent authority of the Member State where they are established, and recognition then applies across the Union (Article 17).
  • Risk assessments. Within one year of entry into force, and every two years after, Member States and EU institutions would identify public sector activities that contribute to public order and decide which level each one needs (Article 29).
  • Procurement. Public buyers would procure at least level 1, and levels 2 to 4 for public-order activities (Article 30). Tenders for innovative cloud and AI services would include "Union added value" award criteria, which must stay "ancillary and not decisive" (Article 32).
  • Shared public cloud. A European public-sector cloud federation, "EuroCloud Federation", would let public bodies share data centre and cloud services (Article 34).
  • Open source. Public bodies would be encouraged to prefer open-source solutions, and the Commission would maintain an open source solutions catalogue (Articles 41 to 43).

The proposal also sets a goal that at least 25% of Member States' procurement of cloud and AI services go to innovative SMEs (Article 33). The Council compromise removes that exact percentage, which tells you how much of this text is still in play.

What are the four Union assurance levels, and how are they different from the "levels" vendors sell?

The four Union assurance levels are a legal ladder defined in Annex II of the proposal. Level 1 is a self-assessed baseline of EU establishment and EU-only data; level 2 adds an independent audit, EU personnel and EU-only support while still allowing a non-EU parent under safeguards; level 3 excludes non-EU control by default; level 4 adds EU citizenship, a "high" cybersecurity certificate and control over the software supply chain.

I summarised the Annex II criteria in one table. Read the proposal itself before you rely on any cell, because the wording is precise and the Council is already redrafting parts of it.

Criterion (Annex II)Level 1Level 2Level 3Level 4
How it is demonstratedSelf-assessment and EU statement of conformityIndependent third-party audit, reviewed annuallyIndependent auditIndependent audit
Provider established in the EUYesYes, provider and subcontractorsYes, provider and subcontractorsYes, provider and subcontractors
Infrastructure locationEU, unless the public body requires otherwiseEU, including personnelEU, including personnelEU, including personnel
Customer data, metadata and telemetryEU only, unless the public body requires otherwiseEU only, unless the public body requires otherwiseEU only, unless the public body requires otherwiseData identified as sensitive stays in the EU
StaffNo requirementScreening and EU citizenship if the public body asksEU citizens, security clearance where neededEU citizens, security clearance where needed
Technical and operational supportNon-EU support allowed with traceability and governancePerformed exclusively in the EUEU only, EU residents, by parties not under non-EU controlEU only, EU residents, by parties not under non-EU control
Control by a non-EU country or companyAllowedAllowed, with measures preventing access to data, disruption and foreign sanctions enforcementNot allowed, unless the Commission recognises that third country by implementing actNot allowed
Cybersecurity certificationState of the artEU scheme at "substantial", or national scheme until one existsEU scheme at "substantial", or national schemeEU scheme at "high", or national scheme
Customer data used to train non-EU AINo criterionNot allowedNot allowedNot allowed
Software supply chainNo criterionSBOM, controls on remote features, source code audits of third-country security componentsSame as level 2SBOM plus effective EU control over design and maintenance of software components

Source: Annex II and Articles 16 to 21 of COM(2026) 502.

Three details changed how I think about sovereign deployments.

Metadata and telemetry count from level 1. The criterion is "customer data, including metadata and telemetry data". Your CI/CD tool, your observability vendor, your error tracker and your deployment control plane all produce metadata. If they ship it outside the EU, a service built on them may struggle to claim even the baseline.

Level 2 is open to US-owned providers by design. It allows a provider "subject to the control of a third country" as long as it demonstrates measures that prevent foreign access to customer data, service disruption and the enforcement of foreign sanctions. That is roughly the territory of the sovereign offers from AWS, Microsoft and Google that I described in the four levels of EU cloud sovereignty. Whether a given offer would pass the audit is an open question nobody can answer until auditors exist.

Level 4 reaches into software. It asks the provider to show that no non-EU entity holds "effective control over the design, development, maintenance, and evolution" of its software components. Open-source software is handled by a separate criterion about blocking remote features. A stack built on open-source components (Linux, Kubernetes, PostgreSQL) looks easier to defend under that wording than a proprietary one licensed from a non-EU vendor.

The ladder in my earlier article and the CADA ladder both have four rungs, and they do not line up one to one. The earlier one sorts the market by ownership and operations. CADA's is a legal test that a single service either passes or fails, and an EU-owned provider could still fail level 2 if its support runs from outside the EU.

Keep your sovereignty level a procurement decision.
Qovery deploys your apps on Kubernetes in your own AWS, GCP, Azure or Scaleway account, or on an existing cluster at an EU provider or on-premise, so moving up an assurance level does not mean rebuilding your delivery pipeline.

Who would the act apply to: public sector only, or private companies too?

As proposed, the binding procurement obligations apply to public sector bodies, EU institutions and contracting authorities, but private companies are affected in three ways: as suppliers to the public sector, as NIS2 entities that may run the same risk assessments voluntarily, and through the providers whose recognition levels will become a selling point.

Direct scope, as drafted:

  • Public sector bodies and EU institutions. Activities not identified as public-order relevant would use services recognised at level 1 (Article 30(2)).
  • Public-order activities. Contracting authorities in NIS2 sectors (Annexes I and II of Directive (EU) 2022/2555) and in national security, internal security, border management, defence, justice and law enforcement would only procure level 2, 3 or 4 (Article 30(3)).
  • Migration deadline. Where a risk assessment requires a change of service, the buyer would migrate within a transition period of up to 12 months (Article 29(6)). The Council compromise extends that to 18 months.
  • Exceptions. Buyers could skip the requirement in justified cases, such as no suitable tenders in a similar procedure within the previous year, or disproportionate cost (Article 30(4)).

The Council compromise already moves this scope. The Council progress report of 13 November 2026 says the text was "modified to extend the scope of the provisions on public procurement to contracting entities covered by Directive 2014/25/EU" (utilities such as electricity and water supply), removes national security and defence from the risk assessment provisions, and replaces the Commission's power to overrule national risk assessments with recommendations.

Private companies outside that scope would feel it in three places:

  • If you sell software to the EU public sector. CADA reuses the NIS2 definition of a cloud computing service, and NIS2 lists "Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), Software as a Service (SaaS)" among cloud service models (NIS2, recital 33). The Annex II criteria cover the provider and its subcontractors involved in delivering the service. My reading is that a SaaS vendor selling to a ministry would need recognition for its own service, and its IaaS provider would be assessed as a subcontractor.
  • If you are a NIS2 essential entity. Article 31 lets private entities in NIS2 Annex I sectors carry out "similar assessments". It is voluntary in the proposal, and the Council deleted the Commission's power to make it mandatory by delegated act. Expect regulated buyers in energy, banking and health to borrow the framework in their own vendor questionnaires anyway.
  • If you buy from a provider that gets recognised. Recognitions would be published in a central repository (Article 22). A recognised level will become a line in every RFP, the way SecNumCloud already is in France.

How does CADA fit with the Data Act, NIS2, DORA, the AI Act and national certifications?

CADA adds a sovereignty test on top of laws that already apply. GDPR covers personal data, the Data Act already forces cloud providers to make switching possible and free, NIS2 and DORA cover security and operational resilience, the AI Act covers AI systems, and national schemes such as SecNumCloud are the closest thing to CADA's higher levels that you can buy today.

InstrumentStatus in November 2026What it does for a sovereign deployment
Cloud and AI Development ActProposal, in negotiationFour Union assurance levels, public procurement minimums, data centre permitting
Data Act, Regulation (EU) 2023/2854In force; switching rules applySwitching and egress charges for moving between cloud providers fully abolished from 12 January 2027 (Article 29)
NIS2, Directive (EU) 2022/2555In force through national transpositionCybersecurity risk management and incident reporting, including for cloud providers
DORAApplies to financial entitiesICT third-party risk, exit strategies and oversight of critical ICT providers
AI ActIn force, applying in stagesRules on AI systems and models; the CADA memorandum notes it "does not cover aspects of sovereignty"
EUCS (Cybersecurity Act scheme)Not adoptedCADA levels 2 to 4 point to it for certification; work "will resume" per the memorandum
SecNumCloud (France), BSI C5 (Germany)Operational national schemesFill the certification slot "until the establishment" of an EU scheme

The interaction I find most useful is between CADA and the Data Act. CADA tells a public body which level it needs. The Data Act already makes it cheaper for anyone to move to a provider at that level, because switching charges disappear on 12 January 2027. If your architecture is portable, those two together make a migration a commercial decision rather than a technical project.

On certification, CADA says Level 2 and above rely on a European cybersecurity certificate "provided that such a scheme has been established", and national schemes apply until then. In practice that keeps France's SecNumCloud and Germany's BSI C5 at the centre of the conversation for years. I compared the French options in NumSpot vs OVHcloud vs Scaleway for SecNumCloud.

What should a company planning a sovereign cloud deployment in Europe do now?

Do not wait for the final text, and do not over-commit to one provider because of a draft. Map your workloads to the likely assurance level, check where your metadata and support sit, keep the deployment layer portable, and make the move between providers a configuration change you have tested.

What I would do, by company profile:

If you are...What CADA likely means for youWhat to do in the next 6 months
A software vendor selling to EU public bodiesYour SaaS would need level 1 recognition at least, and level 2 to 4 for public-order customersMap every subcontractor in your delivery chain, including CI/CD, observability and support tooling; plan an EU-only deployment option
A NIS2 essential entity (energy, health, transport, banking)Voluntary risk assessments now, likely embedded in regulators' and auditors' expectations laterRun a CADA-style risk assessment per workload; document which ones would need level 2 or higher
A financial entity under DORACADA adds a sovereignty lens to exit strategies you already oweTest one exit to an EU provider end to end and keep the evidence
A scale-up selling mostly to private customersIndirect: questions in RFPs from public and regulated buyersKeep data, metadata and support in the EU where cheap; keep workloads portable
A company already on an EU-owned providerLikely well placed for levels 1 to 3, subject to support and certificationCheck support location, telemetry flows and certification; prepare for audit evidence

The checklist I give teams:

  • Classify each workload by the level its most demanding customer would need, not by the level of your current provider
  • List every tool that sees customer data, metadata or telemetry, and where each one stores it
  • Ask every vendor in the chain, including us, where its control plane, metadata and support staff are located
  • Containerise workloads and run them on Kubernetes so the runtime is the same on any provider
  • Describe infrastructure in Terraform or OpenTofu, in a cloud account you own
  • Rehearse a migration of one service to an EU-owned provider before anyone asks you to
  • Track the Council compromise and the Parliament position, because thresholds and deadlines are moving

The rehearsal matters most. In my experience, the hard part of moving clouds is everything that grew around one provider: the managed services, the IAM model, the networking and the CI/CD wiring. I wrote about that in leaving AWS for a European cloud without rebuilding your app, and my comparison of sovereign cloud providers in Europe for Kubernetes covers which EU providers run a managed Kubernetes you can build on.

How does Qovery help a team stay ready for whatever level CADA ends up requiring?

Qovery keeps the deployment layer identical across clouds, so your assurance level becomes a choice of cloud account or cluster rather than a rebuild. It deploys your applications on Kubernetes in your own AWS, GCP, Azure or Scaleway account, or on an existing cluster at an EU provider or on-premise, with the same git-push workflow, environments, RBAC and audit logs everywhere.

What that means for CADA planning, concretely:

  • Your data plane is yours. Qovery's control plane is separate from the data plane. Your workloads, data and cluster run in your own cloud account or on a cluster you bring, including on providers such as OVHcloud, IONOS or StackIT through bring-your-own-Kubernetes (Kubernetes 1.31 or later). Qovery does not host your applications.
  • The same workflow at every level. The same application can run in an AWS EU region for one customer and on a Scaleway or on-premise cluster for a public sector customer that needs a higher level, with the same environments, preview environments per pull request and deployment pipeline.
  • Evidence for audits. RBAC and audit logs show who changed what and where, which helps you document controls. Qovery helps you meet controls; it does not make your service compliant or recognised at any level.
  • Infrastructure as code. The Qovery Terraform provider describes environments and services in code, so the move between accounts and providers is reviewable and repeatable.

Two honest limits. Qovery's control plane is itself part of your delivery chain, so include it in the vendor questions above and ask us where it runs and what metadata it holds, the same as for any other tool. And cross-cloud networking is not built in; if you split workloads across providers, you configure it with a VPN, Cilium Cluster Mesh or Tailscale.

If you sell to EU public bodies and want to map your setup to the proposed levels, talk with us.

Frequently asked questions
What does the EU Cloud and AI Development Act mean for companies planning sovereign cloud deployments in Europe?

The Cloud and AI Development Act is still a proposal, so it creates no obligation today. If adopted as proposed, public bodies would buy cloud services recognised at one of four Union assurance levels, and suppliers to them, including SaaS vendors and their subcontractors, would need to meet those criteria. Companies planning sovereign deployments should keep data, metadata and support in the EU where possible and keep workloads portable between providers.

Is the Cloud and AI Development Act already law?

No. The European Commission proposed it on 3 June 2026 (COM(2026) 502), the Council is working on a compromise text, and the European Parliament plans to adopt its position on 27 April 2027. The final text will come out of trilogue negotiations, then apply 12 months after entry into force as proposed, or 18 months in the Council's compromise.

Does the Cloud and AI Development Act ban US cloud providers in Europe?

No. As proposed, level 1 and level 2 allow providers controlled from outside the EU, with level 2 requiring audited measures against foreign data access, service disruption and foreign sanctions enforcement. Level 3 excludes non-EU control unless the Commission recognises that third country, and level 4 excludes it entirely. Only public-order activities would be required to use levels 2 to 4.

What is a Union assurance level under CADA?

A Union assurance level is one of four sovereignty levels defined in Annex II of the proposal. Level 1 is self-assessed and requires EU establishment, EU infrastructure and EU-only customer data including metadata and telemetry. Levels 2 to 4 require an independent audit and add EU personnel, EU-only support, cybersecurity certification, software supply chain controls and, at the top levels, no non-EU control.

Does the act apply to private companies or only to the public sector?

The binding procurement rules apply to public sector bodies, EU institutions and contracting authorities, and the Council compromise extends them to utilities procuring under Directive 2014/25/EU. Private NIS2 entities may run the same risk assessments voluntarily. Private companies are mostly affected as suppliers to the public sector and through the levels their cloud providers get recognised at.

How long will companies have to comply once the act is adopted?

As proposed, the regulation applies one year after entry into force, risk assessments are due within one year of entry into force, and a buyer whose assessment requires a change of service would have up to 12 months to migrate. The Council compromise extends the application date to 18 months and the migration period to 18 months. Plan on 2028 or later for binding effects, and use the time to make migration cheap.

Romaric Philogene
About the author
Romaric Philogene

Romaric founded Qovery to make Kubernetes accessible to every engineering team. He writes about platform strategy, developer experience, and the future of cloud infrastructure.

Next step

Keep your sovereignty level a procurement decision.

Qovery deploys your apps on Kubernetes in your own AWS, GCP, Azure or Scaleway account, or on an existing cluster at an EU provider or on-premise, so moving up an assurance level does not mean rebuilding your delivery pipeline.